authors:
- Waal, Frans de
content: 'Frans de Waal, accomplished primate biologist, writes on morality and its
  precursor or foundation in primate evolution. He argues against what he calls Veneer
  Theory, the view that morality in humans is just a thin layer on top of an amoral
  core. Instead, morality, or at least its fundamental building blocks, can be found
  in social mammals, and in particular in primates such as the chimpanzee. He posits
  that morality evolved, and evolution does not do discontinuities (saltatory changes).
  So the development must have been gradual. His views are discussed by the philosophers
  Robert Wright, Christine M Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher and Peter Singer.


  I believe de Waals has a number of valid points, and describes his own and other''s
  findings very well. However, he is rightly criticized by Kitcher and Singer that
  he is vague when he claims that the "building blocks" of morality are there in chimpanzees,
  and therefore, by evolutionary extension, also in the common ancestor of humans
  and chimpanzees. That concept seems to hide more than it reveals.


  The basic issue here, I think, is the emergent nature of morality. Emergence is
  a tricky concept: it says that something new can spring out of something that already
  exists, given certain context and conditions. But it may also say that this new
  thing has some kind of beginning, a proto-existence, in the preceding state. And
  this new thing, when it has come into existence, can be viewed as something "higher
  up". It is based on what is below, but can also affect what is below. The terms
  often used, such as "based on", being "the core of" "the foundation of" and similar
  have a hard time conveying this sense that the emergent property can be both a function
  of, but also affect, the basis of its existence.


  Morality is such an emergent property. It is based on psychological propensities
  common to humans and higher animals such as chimpanzees, but its reliance in humans
  on culture makes it different from what exists in chimpanzees. So although de Waal
  has a point that Veneer Theory is a bad way of describing morality, he too lightly
  skips over the large differences that culture and language produce when combined
  with the psychological common traits of humans and chimpanzees. In general, de Waal
  underplays the importance of culture in humans. Both Peter Singer and Philip Kitcher
  have valid critical points here.'
date: '2021-11-08'
edition:
  published: '2016'
  publisher: Princeton University Press
goodreads: '26597374'
html: '<p>Frans de Waal, accomplished primate biologist, writes on morality and its
  precursor or foundation in primate evolution. He argues against what he calls Veneer
  Theory, the view that morality in humans is just a thin layer on top of an amoral
  core. Instead, morality, or at least its fundamental building blocks, can be found
  in social mammals, and in particular in primates such as the chimpanzee. He posits
  that morality evolved, and evolution does not do discontinuities (saltatory changes).
  So the development must have been gradual. His views are discussed by the philosophers
  Robert Wright, Christine M Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher and Peter Singer.</p>

  <p>I believe de Waals has a number of valid points, and describes his own and other''s
  findings very well. However, he is rightly criticized by Kitcher and Singer that
  he is vague when he claims that the &quot;building blocks&quot; of morality are
  there in chimpanzees, and therefore, by evolutionary extension, also in the common
  ancestor of humans and chimpanzees. That concept seems to hide more than it reveals.</p>

  <p>The basic issue here, I think, is the emergent nature of morality. Emergence
  is a tricky concept: it says that something new can spring out of something that
  already exists, given certain context and conditions. But it may also say that this
  new thing has some kind of beginning, a proto-existence, in the preceding state.
  And this new thing, when it has come into existence, can be viewed as something
  &quot;higher up&quot;. It is based on what is below, but can also affect what is
  below. The terms often used, such as &quot;based on&quot;, being &quot;the core
  of&quot; &quot;the foundation of&quot; and similar have a hard time conveying this
  sense that the emergent property can be both a function of, but also affect, the
  basis of its existence.</p>

  <p>Morality is such an emergent property. It is based on psychological propensities
  common to humans and higher animals such as chimpanzees, but its reliance in humans
  on culture makes it different from what exists in chimpanzees. So although de Waal
  has a point that Veneer Theory is a bad way of describing morality, he too lightly
  skips over the large differences that culture and language produce when combined
  with the psychological common traits of humans and chimpanzees. In general, de Waal
  underplays the importance of culture in humans. Both Peter Singer and Philip Kitcher
  have valid critical points here.</p>

  '
isbn: '9780691169163'
language: en
lastmod: '2021-11-08'
path: /library/waal-2006.html
published: '2006'
rating: 4
reference: Waal 2006
reviewed: '2021-11-08'
subjects:
- human-evolution
- morality
- political-philosophy
- science
title: 'Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved'
type: book
year: 2006